Introduction
In a series of seminal papers, Sims (2003 Sims ( ,2006 has proposed a novel approach to bounded rationality. It is based on the view that people face information capacity constraints de…ned using Shannon's (1948) theory of information.
More precisely, the number of bits that one can use to process the exogenous variables (like income) into the endogenous ones (like consumption) is limited.
That informational requirement is de…ned by Shannon's mutual information concept, which tells us the amount of information obtained on a variable when one observes another, correlated one.
As a consequence of that information constraint, the endogenous variable is noisy compared to the optimal behaviour that would prevail absent an informational constraint. Thus, is many applications (such as Luo (2008), who studies a consumption problem, and the papers cited below on price-setting) the agents rationally allocates this noise so as to maximize its utility subject to the information capacity constraint. The more noisy is the endogenous I am indebted to Enduardo Engel, Giuseppe Moscarini, Filip Mateka, Christopher Sims, and seminar participants at Sciences Po, Paris, CREI, Universitat Pompeu Frabra, Barcelona, Universidade do Minho, Braga, Tilburg, Princeton, Yale and IMT Lucca, for helpful comments and suggestions. variable in a given zone of the distribution of exogenous variables, the less the agent pays attention to that zone and the greater the informational capacity left for processing other zones.
As pointed out by Sims, the reason why noise must inevitably arise is that if the distribution of the exogenous variables is continuous, then an in…nite amount of information would be needed to process a deterministic mapping from the exogenous variables into the endogenous ones.
In some settings, the noise is inherent to the problem of measuring a signal and the agents'informational capacity is used to reduce such a noise. The rational inattention theory then tells us, in some sense, how to optimally design the noise so as to get the highest possible welfare subject to the information capacity constraint.
In other settings, though, the result that behaviour adds noise to the exogenous variables is unpalatable. If the realization of the latter is perfectly observed then the agent would have to generate the noise arti…cially, but then it is problematic to ignore the information needed to generate such noise. It would then be more reasonable to assume that the behaviour of the agent remains deterministic while the information processing constraint prevents it from targeting the optimal behaviour. However, that is not what is happening in the rational inattention literature.
In this paper, I propose an alternative approach to that issue. The idea is that the choice variable may be a deterministic function of the exogenous one and still make use of a …nite amount of information if the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous; that is, the mapping from the realization of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece-wise constant, re ‡ecting the fact that the agent can only elect a …nite number of values for the choice variable, because of the informational constraint.
Thus, limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior, rather than a source of noise. The state space faced by the agent is partitioned into clusters and all points in the same cluster yield the same action. Of course, limited information is not the only source of lumpy behavior; it is well known that there are other sources, such as …xed or linear adjustment costs. But the approach proposed here yields many potentially testable predictions: In general, we expect that the greater the information processing ability of an economic entity, the less lumpy its behavior.
Another central result (Section 2) is that the mutual information between the exogenous variable and the endogenous one is simply equal to the entropy, in the usual discrete sense, of the endogenous variable. That is, the mutual information does not depend on the exact mapping from the exogenous variable to the endogenous one but only on the probability weights of the (discrete) distribution of the latter. This remedies some weaknesses of the continuous notions of entropy which is used in the literature, which makes it impossible to separate the probability weights of the variables from their actual values. More results regarding the convexity of clusters and the properties of the solution when shocks can be aggregated into composite ones are derived in section 3.
Sections 4 and 5 illustrate the kind of results that my approach would deliver by applying it to two simple examples: a general linear-quadratic problem with a uniform distribution, and a simple static model of pricesetting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. This model delivers a lumpy price-setting behavior where the number and size of clusters depends on the dispersion of shocks and the …rm's information processing capacity. It is consistent with recent micro-level evidence on reference prices found by Eichenbaum et al (2008) .
The literature that has studied this issue (in particular, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009a,b) , Paciello (2007) ) uses Sim's noisy approach and has shown that under rational inattention prices were "sticky" in the sense that the aggregate price level was not reacting one for one to the aggregate money stock 1 . However, prices are not lumpy: even a small monetary shock will generate a small (but non neutral) response of individual prices (one notable exception is Moscarini (2004)) 2 . Here, in contrast, rational inattention leads to lumpy price-setting behavior; for prices to change, the shocks faced by a …rm must be large enough to trigger a move to a di¤erent cluster. As discussed in Section 6, this makes a substantial di¤erence. In the noisy approach, it is optimal to react less than one for one to monetary shocks because one can only react to a noisy measure of those shocks, as in the Lucas (1972) misperception model. Consequently, such underreaction also prevails at the aggregate level. Here, though, no noise is introduced and stickiness arises at the individual level because the same price is charged within a cluster of realizations of the individual price setter's relevant shock.
But, as in Caplin and Spulber (1986) , such stickiness is greatly reduced in the aggregate because of the contribution of the …rms which move across clusters as a result of a monetary shock.
It is important to note that while lumpiness is the only way to reconcile limited mutual information with deterministic behavior, the converse is not true. Depending on the objective function and the distribution of noise, the support of the endogenous variable may either be discrete or continuous, as recently found by Matejka (2008) and Matejka and Sims (2010) , who provide some partial but powerful su¢ cient conditions for discreteness to arise. Yet, even in this case, it is always optimal to have a noisy behaviour, so that the implications for aggregate price stickiness will resemble those of Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009a) , rather than those derived here.
2 In that paper, lumpiness arises for di¤erent reasons than here. Time is continuous and there is a constraint on the ‡ow of information processed by the agent. the exogenous variable follows a di¤usion process. A noisy signal of that variable can be obtained at a cost. The cost structure of information is such that the signal will be drawn infrequently, at discrete dates. Thus there is lumpiness "in time" rather than in the state space. Consequently, the model is similar to that of Mankiw and Reis's (2002) sticky information paper.
Continous and discrete entropy and mutual information
It is somewhat important to realize that there are two di¤erent concepts of entropy. For a discrete distribution with n outcomes and probabilities p i ; i = 1; :::; n; we may de…ne entropy as
On the other hand, for a continuous distribution with density f (x); we may de…ne entropy as
The reason why the two concepts do not coincide is as follows. A discrete distribution is always the limit of a sequence of continuous distributions, as they become more concentrated around the discrete outcomes. However, the continuous entropy H of those approximations does not converge to the corresponding S: Instead, it converges to 1.
Take for example the extreme case where x = 0 with probability 1.
Clearly, S(x) = 0: This discrete distribution is the limit of the continuous one de…ned by density f " (x) = f (x=")="; for any density f () over ( 1; +1);
which is continuous and such that f (0) > 0; as " goes to zero (in terms of distribution theory, these distributions converge to a Dirac function (x)).
Furthermore,
Entropy is lower, the more concentrated the distribution. For both discrete and continuous distributions, the most concentrated one is when all the mass is at a single point. But the lower bound of S is zero, while that of H is -1:
Let us now turn to mutual information, which plays a key role in the theory of rational inattention. We consider two random variables x and y:
Their densities are g() and f (); respectively. For any realization of x; we denote by f (y j x) the conditional distribution of y and its entropy is
This can be averaged over x; which allows to de…ne the conditional entropy of y :
Now it can be easily shown that the entropy of the joint distribution of x and y; H(x; y); is such that
Consequently, we have that
which is the mutual information between x and y: This quantity tells us how much knowledge of one variable reduces the entropy of the other, on average. If the two variables are independent, then M (x; y) = 0: On the other hand, if one had y = x; then the joint distribution is degenerate and f (y j x) becomes equal to the Dirac function (y x): Hence all the H(y j x) are equal to 1 and so is H x (y): We then have that M (x; y) = +1: This means that knowledge of x gives us an in…nite amount of information about y: The same conclusion would be reached if instead of y = x; there was any other mapping which allowed to retreive one variable from the other.
The theory of rational inattention, as proposed by Sims, assumes that an agent receives a signal y (say, income), which must be processed into a decision variable x (say, consumption): The agent's ability to process information is limited and that limit takes the form of a constraint on the mutual information between the two variables:
M (x; y) K:
Since M (x; y) = +1 if x is a deterministic function of y; this constraint cannot be matched. The endogenous variable must be related to the exogenous one in a noisy fashion for the information capacity constraint to be matched. In other words, processing a continuum of real values with perfect precision requires an in…nite amount of information.
I now show that there is an important exception to that principle, and this is the case when x; while being a deterministic function of y; is "quantized"
in that it only takes a …nite number of values. There is then no longer a mapping from y to x: While x can be retreived from y; the converse is not true. In such a case, the mutual information between x and y remains …nite, and is in fact equal to the discrete entropy S of the random variable x:
Let us consider a collection of values of x; = fx 1 ; :::; x n g; and assume that any y is assigned to one of those values, called x(y): For any i 2 f1; :::ng;
we de…ne T i = fy; x(y) = x i g: To avoid manipulating in…nite quantities, I
will consider my deterministic assignment as the limit, for " ! 0; of the random variable x de…ned by its conditional distribution:
Here again,f () is any density such thatf (0) > 0: We are again in a situation where the conditional of x is a Dirac, now around x(y); and we approximate it by a density which becomes increasingly concentrated around x(y): To …x ideas, one can just take the standard normal density forf ():
Then the following can be proved:
Theorem 1 -Let M (") be the mutual information between x and y if x is distributed according to (1): Let S(X) = X i P i log P i be the discrete entropy of the random variable whose realization is x i ; with corresponding
Proof-See Appendix Theorem 1 tells us that if a policy function is quantized, then the mutual information between the exogenous variable and the policy variable is equal to the entropy, in the discrete sense, of the policy variable. In particular, it only depends on its probability weights and not on the actual values of that variable. Nor does it depend on how the values of y are assigned to the di¤erent clusters, as long as the probability weights are unchanged. 
Some additional results
In this section I provide some additional results that are likely to be relevant in many practical applications.
Assume the value function is V (y; x); where y 2 R n is the vector of exogenous variables and x 2 R p is the vector of endogenous choice variables.
That is, one is maximizing
Assume V is continuous. Assume we have a …nite partition of R n ; fT 1 ; :::; T i ; ::::; T N g;
and let x i the common value of x assigned to any y 2 T i : Assume also that 5 On the other hand, if the policy function were discrete but stochastic, the mutual information would depend on the assignment rules. For example, assume that y is distributed uniformly over [0, 1] and there are two clusters, each with probability 1/2. Then in the deterministic case, M (x; y) = ln 2: In the stochastic case, let p(y) the probability density that y is assigned to cluster 1. Then m(x; y) = ln 2 + R 1 0 (ln p(y) + ln(1 p(y))p(y)dy < ln 2:
y has a density f () with full support 6 , implying that
For any set S; denote by S its interior.
Then a necessary condition for the assignment to be optimal is the no swapping condition:
If this failed to hold, we could take to small neighborhoods around y i and y j of equal probability weights and intervert them, reallocating the …rst one to T j and the …rst one to T i : This would leave the total entropy of the partition unchanged but achieve a higher value of the objective.
This condition allows us to proven a number of results. I …rst consider whether the clusters T i may be convex, a natural property to seek.
Cluster convexity
For any set S; denote by C(S) its convex envelope and by S its closure.
For any real-valued function g(v 1 ; :::; v n ); where v i is a vector of dimension q i ; denote by r i g its gradient with respect to v i ; which is also a vector of dimension q i : Denote by a dot ( ) the scalar product.
Clearly, given an optimal clustering, any other clustering which only differs by sets of measure zero and assigns the same values of x almost surely is also optimal. To get around this problem, I will restrict the choice of clusters to sets with a dense interior, i.e. we must have T i T i ; and that have the same measure as their interior: Since V is continuous, an immediate consequence is that the no swapping condition must also hold for y i 2 T i ; y j 2 T j ;
not just over the interiors of those sets.
Theorem 2 -Assume V is such that:
8x; x 0 ; y; the following property P (x; x 0 ; y; y 0 ) holds for y 0 2 R n M (x; x 0 ; y);
where M (x; x 0 ; y) is a manifold:
Proof -See Appendix
This theorem tells us that if we restrict our choice to usual sets that have a dense interior with full measure, and if P holds except on a set of small dimension, then the optimal clusters have a convex closure, which essentially means that they are convex except perhaps along their boundary, which is of measure zero and irrelevant.
In the quadratic case, V = ky xk 2 ; and (y y 0 ) (r 2 V (x; z)
does not depend on z and is nonzero except over a hyperplane. As a corollary, in the one dimensional case, the partition would consist of intervals.
Property P is a generalized single-crossing condition. If for example p = 1;
then it boils down to monotonicity of @V (x; y)=@y @V (x 0 ; y)=@y; which is a standard single-crossing condition.
Aggregating shocks
Suppose that the multidimensional vector y of exogenous variables only comes into play through a single-dimensional aggregate u(y): Do we get an equivalent solution by reformulating the problem in terms of the composite aggregate u? The following results provide an answer.
Theorem 3 -Assume there exists a continuous mapping u() :
which is regular everywhere i.e. all its partial derivatives cannot simultane-ously vanish, and such that V (x; y) = V (x; u(y)): Assume the single-crossing property P'holds:
Let fT i g be an optimal partition and U i = u( T i ); Then for all i; j; i 6 = j;
Proof -See Appendix
This result shows us that the optimal policy remains essentially deterministic in terms of the composite shock: a given value of the composite shock u is assigned to a single T i ; except for realizations of y that lie on the frontier of a cluster, which is typically of measure zero. An immediate consequence is that nothing is lost by restricting oneself to the "projected" problem, i.e. restating the orginial problem in terms of the composite shock, using its distribution. This is stated in Theorem 4. f (y)dy. Let a partition fU i g of R with assignment fx i g which solves solves problem P 2 :
Then the partition of R p given by fT i = u 1 (U i )g with the same assignment solves problem P 1 :
Proof: See Appendix.
It would be interesting to be able to predict which zones of the space one will pay more attention to. With the preceding notations, cluster i eats
That is ln F (T i ) per unit of probability mass. Therefore, and intuitively, more attention is paid to cluster i; the smaller its weight F (T i ): Unfortunately, not much can be said in general from the …rst-order conditions about which zones of the distribution of y will get more attention. Suppose now that n = 1: Then if the single crossing condition holds T i is an interval [y i ; y i+1 ] and the …rst-order condition for setting the boundary optimally is
where is the Lagrange multiplier of the information capacity constraint.
Therefore, if a cluster i is smaller than its neighbor i 1 (hence paid more attention to), then the RHS is positive, implying that total utility would go up if the common policy applied to cluster i were also applied to the values of y that are close to its boundary y i in the neighboring cluster i 1. Absent the information capacity constraint, one would like to widen cluster i; but doing so would increase the entropy of X: At the optimum, the shadow cost of the extra information needed to widen cluster i is equal to the marginal utility gain of doing so, as captured by the preceding equation.
This illustrates how optimization is done better in the smaller clusters:
Since a smaller cluster is more costly in terms of information, it must in turn deliver greater bene…ts in terms of optimization. This rules out some
then a wide cluster delivers low utility at its borders, and therefore cannot be paid too much attention, meaning it must have a large value of F (T i ): In particular, if the density of F (); f () is very small over a wide area, such an area must typically be included in an even larger cluster to ensure that it has su¢ ciently high probability weight. Apparently, little more can be said beyond these considerations.
The linear-quadratic case
I now apply these ideas to the linear-quadratic case. In its simplest case, the agent receives a continuous signal y 2 R with density f (y) and associated measure F (M ) = R M f (y)dy; and wants to approximate it (in the least squares sense) by a deterministic function x(y) which is constant over each subset of a …nite partition of the domain of y. Thus, using the preceding derivation for mutual information in the discrete case, we can formulate the problem as follows (in the sequel I will use natural logarithms in the de…nition of entropy. Thus K is expressed in bits / ln 2): min n; =(x 1 ;:::;xn);x():R! E(x(y) y) 2 s:t:
As pointed out in the previous section, property (P) is satis…ed, so that the optimal clusters are intervals. Given that mutual information does not depend on the actual values of x; we then have:
Lemma 1 -x n = E(y j y 2 T n ): Therefore x(y) is non decreasing.
Proof: the …rst part is straightforward from the optimal choice of x n : The second derives from the fact that the T n s are intervals except for subsets of measure zero. while the remaining interval has length 1 (N 1) :
The arrangement of those intervals is irrelevant.
Proof -See Appendix.
Note that if capacity K is such that there is an integer number of bits, then K = k ln 2 with k integer, and e K = 2 k : In this important special case, the optimal solution, quite naturally, consists in splitting the interval into 2 k intervals, since one needs exactly k bits to encode the actual interval to which y is assigned. Furthermore, in this limit case where the capacity constraint is marginally binding for N = 2 k , all intervals will have the same length 1=2 k :
If K= ln 2 is not integer, then partitioning into equal intervals is not optimal. Instead, we have one more interval than the largest number of intervals that would allow us to have an equal partition while meeting the informational constraint. We pick N 1 equally sized intervals of length ; and the remaining one has length 0 = 1 (N 1) > : is such that the informational constraint binds with equality.
5 An illustration with price-setting I now discuss the implications of the approach derived above for the problem of price setting and the e¤ects of monetary policy.
Let us consider the following static version of the standard new Keynesian model 7 . There is a continuum of consumers-yeoman farmers of total mass 1.
They are indexed by i and they monopolistically supply an atomistic good with the same index i: Thus there is also a continuum of goods of mass 1.
The utility function for individual j is
where E is the expectations operator, c ij consumption of good i; m j money holdings, p the aggregate price level, z j an idiosyncratic supply shock and x j the supply of good j: The term in X is a negative congestion externality, where X is aggregate real output (de…ned below) and 0: This will allow me to pick the value of so as to focus on a special case which is computationally much simpler, while what is lost by doing so is independent of the point being illustrated here.
For simplicity, the aggregate price level that de ‡ates money holdings in the utility function is assumed to be equal to the price index that is dual to the aggregate consumption index
The usual derivations concerning demand functions and aggregation are made in the Appendix. We can show that each yeoman farmer maximizes the indirect utility function given by:
where j is a composite shock de…ned by
From now on, I will assume that is such that the composite shock does not depend on the aggregate price level:
; spillovers in price formation across …rms are shut down, which greatly simpli…es the analysis. It is then useful to de…ne as = +1 1
:
As a benchmark, we can derive the ‡exible price equilibrium with no informational constraint where a di¤erent price is set for each realization of j : The FOC for price-setting is equivalent to
Integrating we get the aggregate price level:
wherez is an aggregate of z de…ned as
Thus money is neutral, the aggregate price level is proportional to M;
and real aggregate output is constant and equal to
Output is lower, the larger the aggregate cost indexz; the larger the elasticity of the disutility of e¤ort ; and the lower the elasticity of demand for the individual goods, i.e. the larger the markup over marginal cost 1= :
The New Keynesian literature takes this framework and imposes some nominal price rigidity. I now introduce capacity constraints in processing information along the lines discussed above and derive the associated behaviour of output and the price level.
Under rational inattention, people do not have the information processing ability to pursue a rule like (4) for any value of j : Instead they are going to pursue a rule such that the mutual information between p j and j satis…es a capacity constraint. Let us assume that, as in the above analysis, they pursue a discrete deterministic rule and partition the support of j into intervals I k = [ k ; k+1 ] such that a constant value of p j; denoted by p k , is pursued within each interval. We assume k varies between 0 and N + 1; with 0 = 0 and N +1 = +1:
The distribution of the composite shock has density
Individuals select the number of intervals, their bounds and their associated price levels so as to maximize: max N;f k ;k=1;:::;N g;f p k ;k=0;:::
subject to the information capacity constraint
An equilibrium is therefore a set fN; f k ; k = 1; :::; N g; f p k ; k = 0; :::; N gg which maximizes (6) subject to (7). The solution to this problem then delivers the aggregate price level as a function p(M ) of the realization of the aggregate money stock. Given M; a price-setter j is in interval I k i¤ k z j M < k+1 ; which occurs with probability
Therefore, the aggregate price level p(M ) is given by
where by convention H(+1) = 1: This in turn allows us to compute output
Note that the assumption made on guarantees that the environment faced by each price-setter only depends on the exogenous vari-ables and not on the prices set by other agents 8 . This greatly simpli…es the computations.
I solve for such an equilibrium numerically, performing global optimization on all the possible partitions of the domain of into a …nite number of intervals which match the informational capacity constraint. To keep things tractable the possible values for the jump points have been discretized 9 . Table 1 reports some summary statistics for the simulations. I start from a benchmark numerical exercise where both f () and h() are log-normal 10 , with I …rst start by simulating this economy for K = 1:2 and I gradually loosen the information capacity constraint by increasing K: Table 1 reports the corresponding number of clusters along with the variance of log output. shocks is enough to yield near neutrality at the aggregate level, a not unusual result (Caplin and Spulber (1987) , Caballero and Engel (1993) , Burstein and Hellwig (2007) ). The curve is tilda-shaped: at small (resp. large) values of M; most …rms charge their minimum (resp. maximum) price, and an increase in M boosts output. For intermediate values, a composition e¤ect creates a force in the opposite direction, as some …rms move to a cluster with a higher price. This composition e¤ect creates a zone where money growth is 8 Otherwise, the shock and its distribution g() would themselves depend on the aggregate price level, and there would be no closed-form formula such as (8) for the latter-one would then need to search for a …xed point equilibrium rather than just an optimum. 9 More precisely, there are N possible values of k separated by a probability weight of 1= ( N + 1) ; i.e. if those eligible critical values are denoted by~ j ; j = 1; ::::; N ; then R~ In the simulations, one has picked N = 20: 10 In the simulations, the distributions are truncated to eliminate the zone where utility is not de…ned, i.e. p contractionary, which also happens in other models of price rigidity. Figure 2 compares the ‡atter portion of the output curve between a low information (K = 1:2) and a high information (K = 1:5) regime. We see that output is substantially ‡atter in the latter case. Nevertheless, as Table   1 shows, for local increases in capacity, the variance of output may well go up.
It is also interesting to look at the distribution of individual prices. They are reported in Figures 3 (for K = 1:2) and 4 (for K = 1:6): The dimension of each rectangle along the y-axis is the price and along the x-axis it is the probability weight associated with the corresponding interval of values of :
We see that the probability weights on each price are decreasing with the price, meaning that price-setters are devoting more attention to situations where the required price is higher. This is presumably due to the marginal disutility of labor schedule: the utility cost of not paying attention to these states is high because if one charges too low a price the labor input must be very high 11 .
Entropy #of clusters Variance of output 1.2 4 0.17 1.3 5 0.18 1.4 5 0.187 1.5 5 0.1 1.6 6 0.1 Table 1 . Table 2 analyses the e¤ect of an increase in the variance of monetary shocks on the distribution of individual prices for K = 1:4: We compare the benchmark situation (Table 2a ) to one such that Var(ln M ) = 2 and E(ln M ) = 0:5 (Implying that E(M ) is the same as in the benchmark) (Table 2b) . We see that the increase in the variance of money shocks compells price-setters to devote more attention to high realization of those shocks 12 :
the upper-tail of the distribution of the composite shocks is split into more, and …ner, clusters, while the …rst interval is coarser. Also, the variance of log output increases from 0.19 to 0.49. Table 3c performs the reverse exercise of dividing the variance of monetary shocks by 2, while again adjusting the mean log of M to hold E(M ) constant.
We see that the number of clusters is the same, and so is their size, but the order is changed: the second cluster gets the biggest weight, while more attention is paid to low realizations of the shock than before. Table 2b marginal disutility of labor property. But for even larger increases in the variance of money shocks, the price setters will also spend information capacity on the lower tail of the distribution. Thus, for Var(ln M ) = 4; cluster 1 has a minimal weight of 0.048.
Implications for rigidity
As the preceding section makes clear, the quantized model only implies a moderate degree of price rigidity at the aggregate level. By contrast, in a model where noisy behavior is allowed for, as that of Mackoviak and Wiederholt (2009a,b) , the aggregate price level reacts less than one for one to monetary shocks throughout the whole distribution of those shocks. The reason is that this class of models is similar to the Lucas (1972 Lucas ( , 1973 ) misperception model. Information capacity constraints preclude price-setters from reacting one for one to the monetary shock. Instead, they can only react to a noisy signal of the monetary shock. Given that, their optimal inference about the true realization of the money stock will react less than one-for-one to that money stock, as implied by Bayes's Law. The only di¤erence with the Lucas misperception model is that the noise is now designed optimally by the price-setters so as to meet the information capacity constraint. 13 In the aggregate, all individual prices react less than one-for-one to the money shock, 13 As an aside, it is interesting to note that the reaction of prices to monetary shocks is optimal conditional on the existence of noise. In other words, it is not the information capacity constraint which is constraining that reaction to be suboptimally low, but rather the noise itself (of course the noise is also a by-product of the information capacity constraint). To see this, let us get back to the standard Gaussian linear-quadratic problem:
Assume y N (0; 2 y ) and x = ay + "; where a is a reaction coe¢ cient and " the endogenous noise, assumed normal with zero mean and variance 2 " and orthogonal to y: An optimality condition for x is
This optimality condition pins down the correlation between x and y and it would hold if one observed an exogenous noisy signal of y: In our context, we have E(y j x) = a 2 y 2 " +a 2 2 y x: Therefore the optimality condition (9) is equivalent to
The value of the objective function is V = (a 1)
The mutual information between x and y is
Thus our problem is equivalent to maximizing V subject to
Given this constraint, which involves a; it is not a priori obvious that the optimality condition (9) should hold. In contrast, if x and y have a discrete distribution, M (x; y) only depends on the probability weights of their joint distribution, and it is always possible to pick the values of x while leaving M (x; y) unchanged so as to match (9). That M (x; y) is not independent of the values of x because of the presence of a in (11) is a weakness of the entropy concept applied to continuous distributions.
Nevertheless, since one picks both " and a optimally given the constraint (12), one has one degree of freedom left to match the optimality condition (9)-(10), which turns out to hold at the optimum. Indeed, at the optimum a = K K+1 and
This proves that the underreaction of x to y does not come from a failure of (9) that would be the price to pay for matching the information capacity constraint. And, if this were the case, it would be an artifact of the use of continuous entropy. Instead, this underreaction is optimal given the presence of (endogenous) noise, exactly as if the noise were exogenous instead. and so does the aggregate price level. These considerations apply to any model where agents are allowed to introduce noise in their policy functions in order to save on information capacity. In particular, underreaction would also arise if the distribution of the exogenous variable (y) were purely discrete or if that of the endogenous variable (x) turned out to be discrete yet noisy conditional on y as in Matejka and Sims (2010) .
On the other hand, in the quantized model developed here, noisy policies are precluded. The information capacity constraint is matched by lumping the realizations of y in clusters within which the same policy is pursued. The actual value of x within each cluster does not a¤ect the mutual information between x and y; since, as we have seen, it only depends on the probability weights of the discrete random variable x: Therefore, within each cluster one will pick the optimal value of x conditional on being in that cluster, ignoring the information capacity constraint. Consequently, if, in the absence of information constraints, it is optimal for x to react one-for-one to y; this will remain so in the quantized solution when one moves across clusters.
In the aggregate, money neutrality tends to arise in a similar fashion as in Caplin and Spulber (1987) : the large price adjustment of …rms that are near the frontier between two clusters tends to o¤set the price inertia of those …rms that remain in the same cluster. Thus the model, resembles a menu cost model rather than the Lucas misperception model, and has much less aggregate price stickiness.
Discussion
The general message of this paper is that information processing constraints yield lumpy behavior. Thus, when the exogenous variables change, inattention results in inaction, while in the standard approach it is associated with inadequacy, i.e. embodies excess noise. In both cases, the endogenous variable does not react enough to the exogenous one, although here there will be a jump if one crosses the frontier between clusters.
Perhaps the most straightforward example of discreteness in the economic sphere is the system used by the credit rating agencies: instead of providing a continuous default probability, they rely on lumpy letter grades such as AAA, B+, and so forth. Thus, investors can save on information processing by applying simple rules that treat each credit rating category uniformly.
The existence of lumpiness in the adjustment of economic variables has been documented in a number of areas. For example, Doms and Dunne (1998) , studying investment at the plant level, …nd that "Many plants occasionally alter their capital stocks in lumpy fashions. Of the plants in a balanced panel, over half experience a capital adjustment of at least 37 % in one year, and by 50% in two consecutive years". In the area of price setting, Klenow and Kryvstov (2008) using scanner data from the retail trade sector, …nd that …rms pick their prices among a number of …nite "reference" prices, and that the evidence is consistent with the view that it is not costly to change prices as long as the new price remains a reference price. This is exactly what happens in the model described above. On the other hand, reference prices change infrequently, which may be interpreted as the outcome of a costly reoptimization process in light of perceived changes in the underlying distribution of shocks or in the technology for processing information.
14 Finally, evidence of lumpiness in employment can be found in Davis et al (1996) or Caballero et al. (1997) . The latter, in particular, found that the distribution of employment changes is typically bimodal.
Of course, rational inattention is not the only reason why there could be lumpiness. The above literature has mostly focused on …xed and linear adjustment costs and rational inattention and adjustment costs are not mu-14 Analysing this reoptimization process in the quantized case is an important topic for further research. It would allow to construct truly dynamic models of price setting in the fashion of the one spelled out in Section 5. tually exclusive mechanisms. The rational inattention mechanism may be of particular interest when large adjustment costs are implausible, as in the area of price setting. Furthermore, a range of novel predictions may be generated regarding the determinants of lumpiness: The greater an economic agent's ability to process information, the less lumpy its behaviour. Thus one may speculate that advances in information technologies have reduced lumpiness 15 , or that …rms with a greater fraction of highly skilled workers have less lumpy behavior -this may help explain, for example, the …nding by Doms and Dunne (1998) We have that
Let us compute H x (Y ; "): We denote by p(y) the distribution of y and by
: Therefore we have that
where
Therefore,
where Hf = R zf (z) logf (z)dz is the entropy of distributionf () and the last equality can be obtained straightforwardly by considering the variable
Next, we have that Z
Consider the function g n (z; ") =f (z) log
as " ! 0; it converges simply to g n (z) =f (z) log f (z) P n : Furthermore, jg n (z; ")j f (z) logM ; whereM = maxf : According to the Dominated Convergence Theorem, it follows that
From this we get that
Therefore:
QED.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Assume i = 1 to …x ideas. Let y; y 0 2 T 1 Let 2 [0; 1] and y 00 = y + (1 )y 0 : Assume y 00 2 T k :
Then by the no-swapping condition we must have
and similarly for y 0 replacing y :
First, consider the case where P (x 1 ; x k ; y; y 0 ) holds. Consider the function
Then, applying the NSC to y and y 0 ; we get that
and
Suppose x k 6 = x 1 : Since P (x 1 ; x 1 ; y; y 0 ) holds, h 0 () has a constant nonzero sign over [0; 1]; so that h() is strictly monotonous and (15) and (16) cannot hold simultaneously. Therefore, it must be that x k = x 1 ; i.e. y 00 2 T 1 :
Assume now that P (x 1 ; x k ; y; y 0 ) does not hold. Therefore,ŷ i 2 T 1 for all i: Since, by continuity,ŷ i ! y 00 ; it follows that y 00 2 T 1 :
Thus we have proved that C( T 1 ) T 1 : Furthermore, since T 1 is dense, By continuity, we can pick a 0 and b 0 such that a < a 0 < b
QED
Consider a new assignment such that T 1 is replaced by (T 1 S 1 ) [ S 2 ; and still assigned to x 1 ; while T 2 is replaced by (T 2 S 2 ) [ S 1 ;
and still assigned to x 2 ; while all the other clusters are unchanged. Clearly, the new assignment has the same entropy as the initial one, and therefore matches the information capacity constraint. Furthermore, the change in the objective function induced by such a swap is
(V (x 1 ; u(y)) V (x 2 ; u(y)))f (y)dy: By construction u(y) > u(y 0 ) for y 2 S 2 and y 0 2 S 1 ; implying that V (x 1 ; u(y)) V (x 2 ; u(y)) >
f (y)dy; it follows that > 0; which is impossible since the initial assignment is assumed optimal.
Therefore, we must have S = ?; implying that S has at most one point. interval, u() must reach a local extremum at y 1 ; implying that it is singular at y 1 ; which is ruled out by assumption. Thus we have a contradiction and it must be that u( T 1 ) \ u( T 2 ) = ?: QED.
Proof of Theorem 4.
Below I will denote by fX i ; x i g any quantized solution with partition fX i g such that x = x i over X i ; and by V fX i ; x i g the corresponding value of the objective function. Consider fT i ;x i g which solves problem P 1: Then theorem 3 implies that fu(
fT i g and fu( T i )g have the same mutual information. Finally, V fT i ;
V (x i ; u)dm(u), where the equality again comes from the fact that
By a similar argument we can prove that fu 1 (U i ); x i g has the same mutual information as fU i ; x i g and that V fU i ;
Therefore, V fU i ; x i g = V fT i ;x i g; implying that fu 1 (U i ); x i g solves P 1:
Proof of Theorem 5.
Lemma 1 implies that any optimum must be a partition by intervals, up to a set of measure zero. It follows that one cannot improve on such a partition.
By Lemma 2, for any partition the optimal x n must be yn+y n+1 2
; which proves (v). Next, computing the value function for such a con…guration, we get that E(x(y) y) 2 = 1 12
For a given N; we minimize (17) subject to y 0 = 0;
(y n+1 y n ) ln(y n+1 y n ) K:
The FOCs are:
(y n y n 1 ) 2 (y n+1 y n ) 2 = (ln(y n y n 1 ) ln(y n+1 y n )); 0 < n < N:
Note that with N …xed but absent the capacity constraint, optimality would imply that y n y n 1 = y n+1 y n : All intervals would then be of constant length 1=N and the resulting entropy would be ln N: Thus, if ln N < K; then = 0 and the optimal solution is the unconstrained one. However, one can always improve on this by picking a larger N; since the initial con…guration can always be replicated by collapsing the additional interval to a set of measure zero by equating their bounds. Therefore the optimal N will be such that ln N K; i.e. the capacity constraint will be binding. Let us then consider such an N: Call n the length of interval n: The FOC (18) implies that 2 n ln n is invariant across intervals. Since the function X 2 ln X is U-shaped, n can at most have two values, let us call them and 0 :
Clearly, the invariance property is then satis…ed for = and we see that must solve
The function ( ) is increasing and then decreasing and reaches its maximum at = 1=N; at which point we also have 0 = 1=N: Therefore, there is at most one solution such that 0 : Furthermore, (0) = ln(N q) and (1=N ) = ln N: Therefore, there exists a solution for provided ln(N q) < K ln N:
In particular, for any N such that ln N K the set of values of q for which this holds is non empty, since ln(N q) = 0 for q = N 1.
Despite that q is integer, equation (19) Therefore, V is a decreasing function of q; given N; the optimal value of q is the largest possible one, i.e. q = N 1: The resulting loss function is then We assume that the money stock is drawn from a distribution with density f (M ) and c.d.f F (M ): We also assume that the idiosyncratic shock is drawn from a distribution with density h(z) and cumulative H(z):
Solving for the consumer's optimal consumption and money holdings yields, after a few steps, the following relationship:
Aggregating across individuals, this gives the demand curve for good i :
We assume that all producers meet demand. Therefore, x j = C j :Next,
We can also check that X = R C i di 1= = M=p:
